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The psychological effects of six Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 
(5th ed.; DSM-5) psychiatric labels on respondents were evaluated, three of them being 
variants of “personality disorder” (PD). Self-selecting students from a university in Lon-
don, United Kingdom, were invited to take part in a repeated-measures questionnaire 
study delivered online. One hundred and seventy-three participants completed the ques-
tionnaire, responding to 16 items for each of the six mental health labels. Results showed 
that respondents reported the greatest dysphoric reactions to the “paranoid personality 
disorder” label, followed by the “borderline” and “antisocial” personality disorder labels, 
with “major depression,” “anxiety disorder,” and “posttraumatic stress disorder” thereafter. 
Borderline personality disorder was designated as being least understandable of the six 
labels. It is evident that the PD psychiatric labels have greater iatrogenic effects than the 
others included here. From this, we conclude that PD labels produce greater dysphoric 
consequences because they can be construed as implying a fault in an individual’s core and 
immutable sense of self, which in turn may cause significant stigma and distress in those to 
whom they have been applied. We conclude that given these adverse effects of PD labels 
and conceptual problems associated with the notion of personality disorder, that such 
labels at the very least should be replaced by more compassionate and self-explanatory 
terms, which reflect the chronic difficulties forming and maintaining attachments that 
underpin this group of presenting complaints.
Keywords: psychiatric labels; effects; posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD); depres-
sion; personality disorder (PD)
Labeling theory, originating in the work of Tannebaum (1938), and later in that 
of Goffman (1963), argued that having an attribute that is discrediting is 
stigmatiz-ing, with stigmatized individuals being diminished in the minds of those 
perceiving 
the negative attribute and being blamed as the source of the discrediting characteristic, 
resulting in observers distancing themselves. Although there is extensive research on 
psychiatric stigma, less prevalent are studies examining the effects of psychiatric diagnos-
tic labels on those to whom they are applied. Such labeling has been described by Brown 
(2002) as setting up expectations for deviant behavior. Although summary labels can be 
helpful in facilitating communication between professionals, they can be harmful when 
used by those who are unfamiliar with associated anchoring definitions. Scheff (1966) 
postulated that social attitudes are negatively influenced by the presence of psychiatric 
labels and that the mere presence of these negative terms causes patients to adopt prob-
lematic behavior, thereby exacerbating social rejection. Kirk (1974) has challenged these 
conclusions, arguing that it is the behavior of those with the mental illness, rather than 
the mental illness labeling per se that influences other peoples’ responses. Nevertheless, 
Sirey et al. (2001), in a study of newly admitted adults for psychiatric treatments, found 
that medical adherence to pharmacological treatment for depression was significantly 
associated with self-perceived stigma. Where publically stigmatizing ideas are viewed 
as self-relevant, Corrigan, Kerr, and Knudsen (2005) call this “self-stigma.” Such a ten-
dency has been shown to be associated with significantly lower self-esteem among those 
with serious mental illnesses (Link, Struening, Neese-Todd, Asmussen, & Phelan, 2001) 
and as a barrier to recovery from affective disorder (Perlick et al., 2001). Furthermore, 
Corrigan and Watson (2006) note that as well as loss of self-esteem, some react with righ-
teous anger in response to stigma, whereas others appear capable of ignoring the effects 
of public prejudice. However, the World Health Organization (2001) highlighted that 
the stigma associated with a psychiatric diagnosis can create “a vicious cycle of alienation 
and discrimination—leading to social isolation, inability to work, alcohol or drug abuse, 
homelessness, or excessive institutionalisation—which decreases the chance of recovery 
and normal life” (p. 99), assertions substantiated, for example, by the longitudinal work 
of Markowitz (1998). So, the designation and application of psychiatric labels can have 
deleterious material consequences for those to whom they are applied.
PERSONALITY DISORDER LABELS FROM DSM-IV-TR TO DSM-5
In the transition from Diagnostic and Statistical Manual for Mental Disorders (4th ed., text 
rev.; DSM-IV-TR) to DSM-5, there was much debate about the methods by which person-
ality disorders were diagnosed, with a hybrid dimensional-categorical model also included 
in DSM-5 as an alternative for further study (which retains both borderline and antisocial 
personality disorder [PD] as subtypes). This inclusion perhaps signifies disquiet with the 
PDs as a diagnostic group. However, in DSM-5, the categorical approach was retained 
from DSM-IV with the same 10 PDs nominated therein (paranoid, schizoid, schizotypal, 
antisocial, borderline, histrionic, narcissistic, avoidant, dependent, obsessive), with dis-
orders on the first three axes as in previous editions combined onto one. The original 
DSM-IV categorical model attracted criticism for high instances of comorbidity among 
PDs and arbitrary thresholds for diagnosis, thereby arguably bringing into question the 
existence of 10 discrete PDs (Skodol et al., 2005). In one study, 60% of individuals that 
met the criteria for a single PD also met the criteria for another (Skodol et al., 2011). In 
addition, the heterogeneity of PDs is illustrated given that there are at present 256 crite-
ria combinations that can be used to justify a diagnosis of borderline personality disorder 
(BPD; Samuel et al., 2012). Skodol et al. (2011) argued that there is substantial empirical 
support for antisocial, borderline, and schizotypal PDs, whereas there is limited evidence 
for paranoid personality disorder (PPD). Although PPD is not included in the hybrid 
model in DSM-5, and although its removal was flagged as a possibility, nevertheless, it 
remains in DSM-5 as one of the 10 PDs specified therein.
“BORDERLINE PERSONALITY DISORDER” AS EXEMPLAR OF 
IATROGENIC EFFECTS
Research by Markham (2003) focused on whether people are viewed negatively and are 
rejected based on psychiatric labeling. In the study, mental health nurses completed ques-
tionnaires to indicate their attitudes and perceptions of patients with BPD, schizophrenia, 
and depression. Markham found that these respondents were less optimistic about indi-
viduals with BPD compared with those designated as having schizophrenia or depres-
sion. Markham suggests that clinicians hold strong negative perceptions of patients with a 
PD label, despite understanding the characteristics of a patient with PD. Clinicians have 
referred to clients with BPD as “more difficult,” “manipulative,” “less deserving of care,” 
and “hateful,” such terms reflecting a lack of empathy and the potential for unsympathetic 
treatment (Markham, 2003). Lewis and Appleby (1988) found that psychiatrists were 
inclined to feel less involved with their patients prior to seeing them once they realized 
they had been given a diagnosis of BPD. Similarly, psychiatric nurses in a study by Fraser 
and Gallop (1993) reported that they were more empathic to patients diagnosed as having 
affective disorder than they were with patients diagnosed with BPD. This response is par-
ticularly unfortunate for clients with BPD, given this group is especially sensitive to rejec-
tion and may perceive it as abandonment, thereafter resorting to self-harm or withdrawal 
from treatment (Brown, 2002). According to Gallop, Lancee, and Garfunkel (1989), the 
stigmatizing effects of BPD can independently contribute to such negative outcomes.
EFFECTS OF OTHER PERSONALITY DISORDER LABELS
Similarly, Birkeland (2011) has found those diagnosed as having PPD are also referred to 
as “difficult” and with whom it is “hard to form relationships.” PPD is typified by a pattern 
of traits, which include suspiciousness, extreme sensitivity, and unwarranted doubt about 
the loyalty or trustworthiness of close friends and family, although research on PPD is 
limited, given that patients with paranoid thoughts and behavior are extraordinarily indis-
posed to seeking psychiatric help (Salvatore, Nicolo, & Dimaggio, 2005). Hinshelwood 
(1999) argues that patients with PD are seen as difficult because of their ability to evoke 
personal emotion from mental health workers, which essentially challenges their profes-
sionalism. We might expect similarly stigmatizing effects of other PD labels, in particular 
of antisocial personality disorder (ASPD), which includes a disregard for the rights of 
others from early teenage years and the presence of conduct disorder before the age of 
15 years (including extensive “delinquent” behavior, such as theft, arson, law breaking, 
with lack of remorse). Left unexamined, according to Markham and Trower (2003), the 
diagnostic descriptors can become a justification for discrimination that leads to early 
termination of care as well as other possible negative outcomes.
PREVIOUS CALLS FOR DIFFERENT NAMES
Could a name change be enough for PDs and other mental health labels to reduce stigma? 
In support of this, Heller (as cited in Bogod, 2009) believes that the BPD label is inaccu-
rate, explaining that it possesses negative judgemental connotations and pointing out that 
the suggestion that there is a fault with the whole person is an attack on an individual’s 
personality. Heller argues that research on BPD indicates that the cause of the disorder 
is not a “flawed personality,” but rather it is a biologically based brain disorder, with a 
dysfunction in the limbic system; he proposes thereby that BPD be relabeled “dyslimbia,” 
with others suggesting it be called “emotional dysregulation disorder” (Porr, 2001).
THE CURRENT STUDY
In the literature discussed thus far, it is clear that further research is needed about the 
negative effects of psychiatric labels on people to whom they have been assigned. There 
is an absence of such work focusing on PPD and ASPD, whereas that on BPD is limited 
in scope. Furthermore, studies have not established the relative distressing effects of these 
diagnostic terms or compared their effects with ones used to denote more commonplace 
mental health difficulties, such as major depression, generalized anxiety disorder, and post-
traumatic stress disorder. Using a repeated-measures design, this study seeks to redress this 
omission and extend the work of Markham (2003) by examining the relative iatrogenic 
effects of three PD labels (BPD, ASPD, PPD) and three more commonplace mental health 
disorder labels as listed earlier. It is hypothesized that the three PD labels will produce the 
greatest dysphoric responses to the six labels included, with the three more commonplace 
diagnostic labels being rated as least distressing and most understandable.
METHOD
Participants
Of 240 participants who logged onto SurveyGizmo and attempted to complete the online 
repeated-measures questionnaire, 173 did so. The age of the sample ranged from 18 to 75 years 
with a mean of 28.86 years, SD 5 9.46. Most (99.4%) were 18–60 years old, with only one 
respondent older than this. Seventy-nine percent of the sample were aged 18–35 years. 
Eighty-one participants (46.8%) were male, and 92 (53.2%) were female. Ninety-eight 
(56.6%) self-designated as full-time students, 12 (7%) as part-time students, 43 (25%) 
as being in full-time employment, 3 (1.7%) as being in part-time employment, 5 (3%) 
as unemployed, 5 (3%) as a house-husband/wife, 1 (0.6%) as retired, and 6 (3.5%) self-
classified as “other.” Sixty-three percent of the sample were students attending a university 
in London, United Kingdom. Socioeconomically, modal income was £0–£5,000 per annum 
(31%), with 65% earning no more than £20,000 per annum. In terms of educational attain-
ment, 38.7% (n 5 65) of respondents had end-of-secondary school “A” level qualifications, 
whereas 26.2% (n 5 44) had achieved an undergraduate education, and 17% (n 5 28) at 
postgraduate level. The sample was ethnically inclusive and diverse, reflecting the intake of 
the university and of the London metropolitan area. As an example of this, 36% (n 5 62) 
self-designated as Black African, Black British, or Black Caribbean, whereas 29% self-
designated as White British/English or White, with the remaining 35% self-designating as 
either Asian, Bangladeshi, Chinese, British Mauritian, Hispanic, Irish, Italian, Moroccan, 
Pakistani, Portuguese, or Swedish. Most of the sample were single (60.1%; n 5 104), with 
29 (16.8%) married, 27 (15.6%) cohabiting, and 11 (6.4%) divorced.
Materials
Participants completed an online survey in which they were asked to consider in turn 
six mental health labels in the following order: posttraumatic stress disorder, borderline 
personality disorder, major depression, paranoid personality disorder, anxiety disorder, and 
antisocial personality disorder. For each label, they were asked the following: “If you were 
diagnosed as having [name of disorder] by a psychiatrist, clinical psychologist, or a GP, how 
would that make you feel?” Thereafter, for each label, in a repeated-measures format, par-
ticipants indicated their responses to 15 emotion terms, specifically: upset, embarrassed, 
misunderstood, confused, determined, uncomfortable, burdened, anxious, enlightened, 
afraid, interested, distressed, ashamed, angry, and vulnerable. For each emotion term, par-
ticipants were presented with a 1–7 Likert scale, wherein 1 was anchored as not at all and 
7 as extremely, to indicate how application of the mental health label made them feel. 
For each label, participants also responded to a 16th item (“To what extent is the label 
[name of disorder] understandable to you?”) with a 1–7 Likert scale again provided, wherein 
1 5 not all understandable and 7 5 very understandable. Following these six sections of the 
survey, which contained in all 96 items, a further seven questions solicited demographic 
information (for gender, age, ethnicity, occupation, partnership status, highest level of 
educational attainment, and annual earnings before tax).
Notably, four of the emotion terms (distressed, upset, ashamed, afraid) load significantly 
onto the negative affect factor in the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule, whereas two 
(interested, determined) load significantly onto the positive affect factor, as after Crawford 
and Henry (2004). The remaining nine terms were author-selected to reflect the range of 
possible affective and cognitive responses to psychiatric diagnostic labels and are consid-
ered here appropriate for this purpose.
Procedure
Prospective participants were sent a link to the questionnaire as hosted on SurveyGizmo. 
The link remained active for 3 months (November 2012 to January 2013 inclusive). After 
a participant had activated the online link, a letter of invitation was presented in which it 
was explained that the purpose of the study was to “investigate the effect of mental health 
labels on people.” Participants were informed that they would be asked 16 questions in 
relation to each of six mental health labels and that they would be asked for some addi-
tional information about themselves thereafter. Participants were informed that responses 
would be held confidentially, that respondent’s anonymity would be assured, and that they 
had the right to withdraw and have their data withdrawn without consequence at any 
point. It was explained that by continuing to the first question, participants would be 
indicating that their free and informed consent was being given. At the end of the study, 
all respondents were given access to additional debriefing information and another oppor-
tunity to contact the researchers to ask any questions or to address any residual concerns.
RESULTS
Data from the 173 participants who completed the online questionnaire were exported 
from SurveyGizmo to the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) version 20 
for analysis. Given the questionnaire was administered online wherein progression only 
occurs if all preceding items have been completed, there were no missing values in the 
data set. Scores for the three positive affect items (determined, enlightened, interested) 
were reversed (1 5 7, 2 5 6, 3 5 5; 7 5 1, 6 5 2, 5 5 3) to align them with the scoring of 
the 12 negative affect items. Repeated-measures analyses of variance (ANOVAs) of mean 
scores were computed for each of the 16 questionnaire items, with type of psychiatric label 
as the independent variable—the within-participants factor. Assumptions of homogeneity 
and normality of variance were met using the Greenhouse-Geisser correction. The results 
of these analyses of the means are shown in Table 1, wherein associated F ratios and post 
hoc pairwise comparisons are provided (for the latter, with significance at p , .05 and 
for also when employing Bonferroni adjustment). Two such additional analyses were also 
computed for scores composed of a summation of the 12 negative affect terms and of the 
3 positive affect terms. These are also included in Table 1.
Notably, the “paranoid personality disorder” label was rated as the most upsetting 
(M 5 5.62) and distressing (M 5 5.29) of all of the labels, followed by “borderline per-
sonality disorder” and “antisocial personality disorder” in that order. This ordering of dys-
phoric effect is confirmed in the analysis of the summed means for the 12 negative affect 
terms (F 5 83.62, p , .001). Of the six named mental health labels, “paranoid personality 
disorder,” “borderline personality disorder,” and “antisocial personality disorder” elicit the 
most embarrassment, confusion, discomfort, sense of burden, sense of being misunder-
stood, of anxiety, fear, shame, anger, and vulnerability. By contrast, anxiety disorder and 
posttraumatic stress disorder are found to be the least upsetting and distressing of the six 
mental health labels, with the negative terms summed mean for the “major depression” 
diagnostic label being slightly elevated above this but nevertheless being less than that for 
the three personality disorder labels. Anxiety disorder is shown to elicit the most interest 
and determination from participants.
Finally, the most “understandable” psychiatric label was major depression (M 5 5.30), 
post hoc pairwise comparisons with the other five labels indicating statistically signifi-
cant differences. Although not statistically significant, it is perhaps notable that the least 
understandable mental health label was “borderline personality disorder” (M 5 4.66).
DISCUSSION
The focus of this study was to examine to what extent psychiatric diagnoses, with specific 
reference to PD variants, solicit distressing responses from those to whom they are applied. 
This is an important task, given the report by the World Health Organization (2001), 
which draws attention to the damaging effects of stigma associated with mental ill-health 
for individuals and their families.
The results of this study support the hypothesis that the most distressing psychiatric labels 
considered here are the three PD variants as compared with the three other non-PD mental 
health diagnostic labels included. In descending order of magnitude, respondents reported 
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greater negative emotions in relation to PPD, BPD, and ASPD diagnostic labels. Responses 
across all 12 negative emotion terms were highest for the PPD label, which was also expe-
rienced as an understandable diagnostic term. This pronounced pattern of responding is 
likely to be attributable to the unique component of the label, namely the term paranoid. 
Commonly held understandings of the term paranoid can be accessed through a definition 
of the term in the Concise Oxford English Dictionary (Thompson, 1995), which describes 
“paranoia” as “an abnormal tendency to suspect and mistrust others,” whereas the American 
Psychiatric Association (2013) in DSM-5 defines paranoia as “a pervasive distrust and sus-
piciousness of others such that their motives are interpreted as malevolent” (p. 649). From 
the data, it is apparent then that respondents react especially strongly and aversely to such 
a suggestion. The designation of paranoia in combination with “personality disorder” may 
have been construed by respondents as implying an inadequacy, insufficiency, or weakness 
of the self. Thereby, respondents may well have experienced the designation of PPD as a 
negative form of medicalized name-tagging to which they reacted strongly.
BPD was also rated by respondents as being distressing. In addition, this label was rated 
also as the least understandable of the six diagnostic terms in the study, with a mean of 
4.66. “Major depression” was rated as the most understandable label. This finding sup-
ports the suggestions of Heller (as cited in Bogod, 2009) that a name change for BPD is 
needed, given the current appellation is neither self-explanatory nor avoids the risk of 
being construed as implying the existence of an ongoing fault with the individual’s per-
sonality. Furthermore, the continued use of the BPD label is disputable given an examina-
tion of the stability of the disorder over time: In a 6-year follow-up study of 290 patients 
diagnosed with BPD, Zanarini, Frankenburg, Hennen, and Silk (2003) found that after 
2 years, 34.5% no longer met the criteria for BPD, with this increasing to 73.5% over the 
entire follow-up period. In addition, inappropriate labeling and inaccurate recognition of 
such mental health difficulties is associated with poor help seeking and development of 
poor treatment preferences. Wright, Jorm, Harris, and McGorry (2007), for example, have 
found that accurate recognition and labeling of mental disorders by young people is associ-
ated with better help seeking and treatment preferences, arguing that mental health labels 
function as a cue to activate schemas for appropriate action to be taken. Arguably, “BPD” 
is not immediately comprehensible to members of a nonprofessional audience, so cannot 
help cue treatment preferences. Furthermore, both Gallop et al. (1989) and Aviram, Brod-
sky, and Stanley (2006) report how clinicians react negatively and distance themselves 
from patients with BPD, given the therapeutic and relational challenges associated with 
these clients. This is particularly contraindicated given BPD patient’s pronounced sensi-
tivity to perceived rejection and abandonment, to which they may react negatively by, 
for example, harming themselves or withdrawing from treatment. Notably, Link (1987) 
reports that social rejection is greater for patients with BPD than for either depression or 
schizophrenia. As consistent with what is suggested here, Markham and Trower (2003) 
report that the actual name, BPD, is the source of stigma and of unhelpful causal attribu-
tions about associated challenging behaviors.
As two pre-eminently distressing labels, BPD and ASPD have been shown to constitute 
highly comorbid diagnoses. In a study of 615 current heroin users by Darke, Williamson, 
Ross, Teeson, and Lynskey (2003), it was found that 46% met the criteria for BPD, 71% for 
ASPD, and 38% for both. Therefore, it is probable that these two distressing labels often 
may both be applied clinically to the same individual, with attendant risks of additive 
or multiplicative iatrogenic effects. Batemen and Fonagy (2008) argue that where these 
diagnoses occur together, such individuals tend to misinterpret others’ motives. As this 
may be so, the question is begged as to how such individuals might interpret the motives 
of clinicians ascribing labels to them that even for non-PD respondents (as sampled in this 
study) tend to evoke strong negative emotional responses. The implication of this is clear: 
New, more sympathetic terms are needed to denote those who currently are diagnosed as 
BPD and/or ASPD.
Developing further the “PD” critique here, it is notable that the notion of personality 
rests on the assumption that cross-situational consistencies in behavior are observable. 
Yet, according to reversal theory (Apter, 2001), what is conspicuous about the human 
condition is the inconsistency of an individual’s behavior across situations, thereby call-
ing into question the very concept of personality. Also, for the concept of personality 
to be tenable, agreement should be observable between different measures of the same 
personality construct. However, Ajzen (2005) concludes that “ . . . empirical research has 
shown very little support for consistency between different behaviours presumed to reflect 
the same underlying disposition” (p. 33). It follows, that if personality cannot be reliably 
designated or assessed, it is questionable whether “personality” itself can be “disordered.” 
Rather, research suggests that what is disordered and is a source of reoccurring distress 
in such instances is a profound difficulty in forming and maintaining relationships with 
others, whether it be informal, transitory associations, or close, enduring emotional bonds. 
For example, Haslam, Reichert, and Fiske (2002) found, among 57 participants experienc-
ing significant interpersonal difficulties, that “aberrant social relations,” particularly in 
“authority-based and equality-based relationships,” are related to many PD symptoms. The 
focus on difficulty forming and maintaining relationships is echoed further in Linehan’s 
(1993) proposition that BPD develops when people with a dispositional vulnerability in 
terms of difficulty controlling their emotions are raised in a family that is invalidating, 
where emotions are discounted and disrespected. The relational theme is also to be found 
in Fonagy et al. (1996) where they observe that those classified as having a “preoccupied/
enmeshed” attachment style are more likely to have a BPD diagnosis than those with 
standard attachment and likewise in the work of Nickel et al. (2004) who found that 
those sexually abused during childhood (a precursor of nonstandard attachment) are sig-
nificantly more likely to develop BPD as adults than those who were not. Similarly, the 
interpersonal narrative appears in Hill, Fudge, Harrington, Pickles, and Rutter (2000), 
who compared personality assessment methods and conclude that PD may be assessed in 
terms of interpersonal and social role performance because “ . . . abnormal traits are gener-
ally seen within an interpersonal context” (p. 991). Even those epistemologically opposed 
to such positivist research would appear to agree that relationships and the nonobser-
vance of the rules of social engagement lie at the core of PD formulations, with Pilgrim 
and Hewitt (2001) asserting that “variants of the PD diagnosis are medical codifications 
of the violation of social norms” (p. 527). What is common to PD formulations then is 
not disorder of personality per se but rather disordered and dysfunctional relationship 
formation and maintenance. This in itself may account for the high rates of comorbidity 
observed among PDs, with Dolan, Evans, and Norton (1995), for example, reporting that 
the average number of PDs diagnosed for a patient is between 1.3 and 5.6. However, this 
overlap arguably does not indicate comorbidity but rather signals consanguinity: that is to 
say, fundamentally the same “disorder” in different guises.
It is to be concluded from this data and analysis that the designation of “personality 
disorder” is markedly distressing for those to whom it is applied, and the continued use of 
these terms is not justifiable given the evidence of their effects. What is needed is acces-
sible, self-explanatory terminology that makes clear the role of the severe and chronic 
difficulties experienced forming and maintaining relationships, which lie at the center 
of these disorders. We conclude that given the adverse effects of PD labels and concep-
tual problems associated with the notion of “personality disorder,” such labels should be 
replaced by more compassionate terms, which reflect the interpersonal difficulties that 
underpin this group of presenting complaints. Further research is needed, perhaps using 
qualitative or mixed methods to explore in greater depth respondents’ reactions to these 
diagnostic labels to confirm or disconfirm explanations proffered here for their observed 
effects.
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